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Mark Twain wasn’t thinking about federalism or 
the structure of American government when he 
wrote “The Celebrated Jumping Frog of Calav-
eras County.”1 Nonetheless, he would be amused 
to know that today, almost 150 years later, the 
Calaveras County Fair and Jumping Frog Jubilee 
not only has a jumping-frog contest but also has 
its own Frog Welfare Policy. The policy includes 
a provision for the “Care of Sick or Injured Frogs” 
and a limitation entitled “Frogs Not Permitted to 
Participate,” which stipulates that “under no cir-
cumstances will a frog listed on the endangered 
species list be permitted to participate in the 
Frog Jump.”2 This fair, like medical practice, is 
subject to both state and federal laws. Care of 
the sick and injured (both frogs and people) is 
primarily viewed as a matter of state law, where-
as protection of endangered species is primarily 
regulated by Congress under its authority to reg-
ulate interstate commerce.
Not to carry the analogy too far, but it is 
worth recalling that Twain’s famous frog, Dan’l 
Webster, lost his one and only jumping contest 
because his stomach had been filled with quail 
shot by a competitor. The loaded-down frog just 
couldn’t jump. Until the California medical-
marijuana case, it seemed to many observers 
that the conservative Rehnquist Court had suc-
ceeded in filling the commerce clause with quail 
shot — and had effectively prevented the federal 
government from regulating state activities. In 
the medical-marijuana case, however, a new ma-
jority of justices took the lead out of the com-
merce clause so that the federal government 
could legitimately claim jurisdiction over just 
about any activity, including the practice of 
medicine. The role of the commerce clause in 
federalism and the implications of the Court’s 
decision in the California medical-marijuana 
case for physicians are the subjects I explore in 
this article.
the commerce cl ause
The U.S. Constitution determines the areas over 
which the federal government has authority. All 
other areas remain, as they were before the 
adoption of the Constitution, under the authority 
of the individual states. Another way to say this 
is that the states retain all governmental author-
ity they did not delegate to the federal govern-
ment, including areas such as criminal law and 
family-law matters. These are part of the state’s 
“police powers,” usually defined as the state’s 
sovereign authority to protect the health, safety, 
and welfare of its residents. Section 8 of Article 
I of the Constitution contains 18 clauses specify-
ing delegated areas (including the military, cur-
rency, postal service, and patenting) over which 
“Congress shall have power,” and these include 
the commerce clause — “to regulate commerce 
with foreign nations, and among the several 
states, and with the Indian tribes.”
Until the Great Depression (and the disillu-
sionment with unregulated markets), the Su-
preme Court took a narrow view of federal au-
thority that could be derived from the commerce 
clause by ruling consistently that it gave Con-
gress the authority only to regulate activities 
that directly involved the movement of com-
mercial products (such as pharmaceuticals) 
from one state to another. Since then, and at 
least until 1995, the Court’s interpretation 
seemed to be going in the opposite direction: 
Congress was consistently held to have author-
ity in areas that had almost any relationship at 
all to commerce.
guns in school s and violence 
agains t women
Under modern commerce clause doctrine, Con-
gress has authority to regulate in three broad 
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categories of activities: the use of the channels 
of interstate commerce (e.g., roads, air corridors, 
and waterways); the instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce (e.g., trains, trucks, and planes) 
and persons and things in interstate commerce; 
and “activities having a substantial relation to 
interstate commerce.”3 The first two categories 
are easy ones in that they involve activities that 
cross state lines. The third category, which does 
not involve crossing a state line, is the controver-
sial one. The interpretation question involves the 
meaning and application of the concept of “sub-
stantially affecting” interstate commerce. 
In a 1937 case that the Court characterized 
as a “watershed case” it concluded that the real 
question was one of the degree of effect. Intra-
state activities that “have such a close and sub-
stantial relation to interstate commerce that 
their control is essential or appropriate to pro-
tect that commerce from burdens and obstruc-
tions” are within the power of Congress to reg-
ulate.4 Later, in what has become perhaps its 
best-known commerce-clause case, the Court 
held that Congress could enforce a statute that 
prohibited a farmer from growing wheat on his 
own farm even if the wheat was never sold but 
was used only for the farmer’s personal con-
sumption. The Court concluded that although 
one farmer’s personal use of homegrown wheat 
may be trivial (and have no effect on commerce), 
“taken together with that of many others simi-
larly situated,” its effect on interstate commerce 
(and the market price of wheat) “is far from 
trivial.”5
The 1995 case that seemed to presage a 
states’ rights revolution (often referred to as 
“devolution”) involved the federal Gun-Free 
School Zones Act of 1990, which made it a fed-
eral crime “for any individual knowingly to 
possess a firearm at a place that the individual 
knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a 
school zone.”3 In a 5-to-4 opinion, written by 
the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the 
Court held that the statute exceeded Congress’s 
authority under the commerce clause and only 
the individual states had authority to criminal-
ize the possession of guns in school.3
The federal government had argued (and the 
four justices in the minority agreed) that the 
costs of violent crime are spread out over the 
entire population and that the presence of guns 
in schools threatens “national productivity” by 
undermining the learning environment, which 
in turn decreases learning and leads to a less 
productive citizenry and thus a less productive 
national economy. The majority of the Court re-
jected these arguments primarily because they 
thought that accepting this line of reasoning 
would make it impossible to define “any limita-
tions on federal power, even in areas such as 
criminal law enforcement or education where 
States historically have been sovereign.”3
In 2000, in another 5-to-4 opinion written by 
Rehnquist, using the same rationale, the Court 
struck down a federal statute, part of the Vio-
lence against Women Act of 1994, that provided 
a federal civil remedy for victims of “gender-
motivated violence.” In the Court’s words:
Gender-motivated crimes of violence are 
not, in any sense of the phrase, economic 
activity. . . . Indeed, if Congress may reg-
ulate gender-motivated violence, it would 
be able to regulate murder or any other 
type of violence since gender-motivated vi-
olence, as a subset of all violent crime, is 
certain to have lesser economic impacts 
than the larger class of which it is a part.6
The Court, specifically addressing the ques-
tion of federalism, concluded that “the Consti-
tution requires a distinction between what is 
truly national and what is truly local. . . . In-
deed, we can think of no better example of the 
police power, which the Founders denied to the 
National Government and reposed in the States, 
than the suppression of violent crime and vindi-
cation of its victims.” 6
medic al marijuana in c alifornia
The next commerce-clause case involved physi-
cians, albeit indirectly, and the role assigned to 
them in California in relation to the protection 
of patients who used physician-recommended 
marijuana from criminal prosecution. The ques-
tion before the Supreme Court in the recent 
medical-marijuana case (Gonzalez v. Raich) was 
this: Does the commerce clause give Congress 
the authority to outlaw the local cultivation and 
use of marijuana for medicine if such cultivation 
and use complies with the provisions of Califor-
nia law?7
The California law, which is similar to laws 
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in at least nine other states, creates an exemp-
tion from criminal prosecution for physicians, 
patients, and primary caregivers who possess or 
cultivate marijuana for medicinal purposes on 
the recommendation of a physician. Two patients 
for whom marijuana had been recommended 
brought suit to challenge enforcement of the 
federal Controlled Substances Act after federal 
Drug Enforcement Administration agents seized 
and destroyed all six marijuana plants that one 
of them had been growing for her own medical 
use in compliance with the California law. The 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in the plain-
tiffs’ favor, finding that the California law ap-
plied to a separate and distinct category of ac-
tivity, “the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation 
and possession of cannabis for personal medical 
purposes as recommended by a patient’s physi-
cian pursuant to valid California state law,” as 
opposed to what it saw as the federal law’s pur-
pose, which was to prevent “drug trafficking.”8 
In a 6-to-3 opinion, written by Justice John Paul 
Stevens, with Justice Rehnquist dissenting, the 
Court reversed the appeals court’s opinion and 
decided that Congress, under the commerce 
clause, did have authority to enforce its prohi-
bition against marijuana — even state-approved, 
homegrown, noncommercial marijuana, used 
only for medicinal purposes on a physician’s 
recommendation.
The majority of the Court decided that the 
commerce clause gave Congress the same power 
to regulate homegrown marijuana for personal 
use that it had to regulate homegrown wheat.6 
The question was whether homegrown marijua-
na for personal medical consumption substan-
tially affected interstate commerce (albeit illegal 
commerce) when all affected patients were tak-
en together. The Court concluded that Congress 
“had a rational basis for concluding that leaving 
home-consumed marijuana outside federal con-
trol” would affect “price and market condi-
tions.”7 The Court also distinguished the guns-
in-school and gender-violence cases on the basis 
that regulation of drugs is “quintessentially eco-
nomic” when economics is defined as the “pro-
duction, distribution, and consumption of com-
modities.”7
This left only one real question open: Is the 
fact that marijuana is to be used only for me-
dicinal purposes on the advice of a physician, as 
the Ninth Circuit Court had decided, sufficient 
for an exception to be carved out of otherwise 
legitimate federal authority to control drugs? 
The Court decided it was not, for several rea-
sons. The first was that Congress itself had de-
termined that marijuana is a Schedule I drug, 
which it defined as having “no acceptable medi-
cal use.” The Court acknowledged that Congress 
might be wrong in this determination, but the 
issue in this case was not whether marijuana 
had possible legitimate medical uses but wheth-
er Congress had the authority to make the judg-
ment that it had none and to ban all uses of the 
drug. The dissenting justices argued that person-
al cultivation and use of marijuana should be 
beyond the authority of the commerce clause. 
The Court majority disagreed, stating that if it 
accepted the dissenting justices’ argument, per-
sonal cultivation for recreational use would also 
be beyond congressional authority. This conclu-
sion, the majority argued, could not be sus-
tained:
One need not have a degree in economics 
to understand why a nationwide exemption 
for the vast quantity of marijuana (or other 
drugs) locally cultivated for personal use 
(which presumably would include use by 
friends, neighbors, and family members) 
may have a substantial impact on the inter-
state market for this extraordinarily popu-
lar substance. The congressional judgment 
that an exemption for such a significant 
segment of the total market would under-
mine the orderly enforcement of the entire 
[drug] regulatory scheme is entitled to a 
strong presumption of validity.7
The other primary limit to the effect of the 
California law on interstate commerce is the 
requirement of a physician’s recommendation 
on the basis of a medical determination that a 
patient has an “illness for which marijuana 
provides relief.” And the Court’s discussion of 
this limit may be the most interesting, and dis-
turbing, aspect of the case to physicians. In-
stead of concluding that physicians should be 
free to use their best medical judgment and 
that it was up to state medical boards to decide 
whether specific physicians were failing to live 
up to reasonable medical standards — as the 
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Court did, for example, in its cases related to 
restrictive abortion laws9 — the Court took a 
totally different approach. In the Court’s words, 
the broad language of the California medical-
marijuana law allows “even the most scrupu-
lous doctor to conclude that some recreational 
uses would be therapeutic. And our cases have 
taught us that there are some unscrupulous 
physicians who overprescribe when it is suffi-
ciently profitable to do so.”7
The California law defines the category of 
patients who are exempt from criminal prose-
cution as those suffering from cancer, ano-
rexia, AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma, 
arthritis, migraine, and “any other chronic or 
persistent medical symptom that substantially 
limits the ability of a person to conduct one or 
more major life activities . . . or if not allevi-
ated may cause serious harm to the patient’s 
safety or physical or mental health.” These 
limits are hardly an invitation for recreational-
use recommendations.7 Regarding “unscrupu-
lous physicians,” the Court cited two cases that 
involve criminal prosecutions of physicians for 
acting like drug dealers, one from 1919 and 
the other from 1975, implying that because a 
few physicians might have been criminally in-
clined in the past, it was reasonable for Con-
gress (and the Court), on the basis of no actual 
evidence, to assume that many physicians may 
be so inclined today. It was not only physicians 
that the Court found untrustworthy but sick 
patients and their caregivers as well:
The exemption for cultivation by patients 
and caregivers [patients can possess up to 
8 oz of dried marijuana and cultivate up to 
6 mature or 12 immature plants] can only 
increase the supply of marijuana in the 
California market. The likelihood that all 
such production will promptly terminate 
when patients recover or will precisely 
match the patients’ medical needs during 
their convalescence seems remote; whereas 
the danger that excesses will satisfy some 
of the admittedly enormous demand for 
recreational use seems obvious.7
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s dissent merits 
comment, because it is especially relevant to the 
practice of medicine. She argues that the Con-
stitution requires the Court to protect “historic 
spheres of state sovereignty from excessive fed-
eral encroachment” and that one of the virtues 
of federalism is that it permits the individual 
states to serve as “laboratories,” should they 
wish, to try “novel social and economic experi-
ments without risk to the rest of the country.” 
Specifically, she argues that the Court’s new 
definition of economic activity is “breathtaking” 
in its scope, creating exactly what the gun case 
rejected — a federal police power. She also re-
jects reliance on the wheat case, noting that un-
der the Agricultural Adjustment Act in question 
in that case, Congress had exempted the plant-
ing of less than 200 bushels (about six tons), 
and that when Roscoe Filburn, the farmer who 
challenged the federal statute, himself harvested 
his wheat, the statute exempted plantings of 
less than six acres.5,7
In O’Connor’s words, the wheat case “did not 
extend Commerce Clause authority to some-
thing as modest as the home cook’s herb gar-
den.”8 O’Connor is not saying that Congress 
cannot regulate small quantities of a product 
produced for personal use, only that the wheat 
case “did not hold or imply that small-scale pro-
duction of commodities is always economic, and 
automatically within Congress’ reach.” As to po-
tential “exploitation [of the act] by unscrupulous 
physicians” and patients, O’Connor finds no 
factual support for this assertion and rejects the 
conclusion that simply by “piling assertion upon 
assertion” one can make a case for meeting the 
“substantiality test” of the guns-in-school and 
gender-violence cases.7
It is important to note that the Court was not 
taking a position on whether Congress was cor-
rect to place marijuana in Schedule I or a posi-
tion against California’s law, any more than it 
was taking a position in favor of guns in schools 
or violence against women in the earlier cases. 
Instead, the Court was ruling only on the ques-
tion of federal authority under the commerce 
clause. The Court noted, for example, that Cali-
fornia and its supporters may one day prevail by 
pursuing the democratic process “in the halls of 
Congress.”7 This seems extremely unlikely. More 
important is the question not addressed in this 
case — whether suffering patients have a sub-
stantive due-process claim to access to drugs 
needed to prevent suffering or a valid medical-
necessity defense should they be prosecuted for 
using medical marijuana on a physician’s rec-
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ommendation.10 Also not addressed was the 
question that will be decided during the coming 
year: whether Congress has delegated to the U.S. 
attorney general its authority to decide what a 
“legitimate medical use” of an approved drug is 
in the context of Oregon’s law governing physi-
cian-assisted suicide.11,12 What is obvious from 
this case, however, is that Congress has the au-
thority, under the commerce clause, to regulate 
both legal and illegal drugs whether or not the 
drugs in question actually cross state lines. It 
would also seem reasonable to conclude that 
Congress has the authority to limit the uses of 
approved drugs.
feder alism and endangered 
species
Because Gonzales v. Raich is a drug case, and be-
cause it specifically involves marijuana, the 
Court’s final word on federalism may not yet be 
in. Whether the “states’ rights” movement has 
any life left after medical marijuana may be de-
termined in the context of the Endangered Spe-
cies Act. Two U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, for 
example, have recently upheld application of the 
federal law to protect endangered species that, 
unlike the descendants of Mark Twain’s jumping 
frog, have no commercial value. Even though the 
Supreme Court refused to hear appeals from 
both of the lower courts, the cases help us un-
derstand the contemporary reach of congressio-
nal power under the commerce clause. One case 
involves the protection of six tiny creatures that 
live in caves (the “Cave Species”) — three arthro-
pods, a spider, and two beetles — from a com-
mercial developer. The Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals noted that the Cave Species are not 
themselves an object of economics or commerce, 
saying: “There is no market for them; any future 
market is conjecture. If the speculative future 
medicinal benefits from the Cave Species makes 
their regulation commercial, then almost any-
thing would be. . . . There is no historic trade 
in the Cave Species, nor do tourists come to Tex-
as to view them.”13 Nonetheless, the court con-
cluded that Congress had the authority, under 
the commerce clause, to view life as an “interde-
pendent web” of all species; that destruction of 
endangered species can be aggregated, like 
homegrown wheat; and that the destruction of 
multiple species has a substantial effect on in-
terstate commerce.13
The other case, from the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals, involves the arroyo south-
western toad, whose habitat was threatened by a 
real-estate developer. In upholding the applica-
tion of the Endangered Species Act to the case, 
the appeals court held that the commercial ac-
tivity being regulated was the housing develop-
ment itself, as well as the “taking” of the toad 
by the planned commercial development. The 
court noted that the “company would like us to 
consider its challenge to the ESA [Endangered 
Species Act] only as applied to the arroyo toad, 
which it says has no ‘known commercial value’ 
— unlike, for example, Mark Twain’s celebrated 
jumping frogs [sic] of Calaveras County.”14 In-
stead, the court concluded that application of 
the Endangered Species Act, far from eroding 
states’ rights, is consistent with “the historic 
power of the federal government to preserve 
scarce resources in one locality for the future 
benefit of all Americans.”14
On a request for a hearing by the entire ap-
peals court, which was rejected, recently named 
Chief Justice John Roberts — who at the time 
was a member of the appeals court — wrote a 
dissent that was not unlike Justice O’Connor’s 
dissent in the marijuana case. In it he argued 
that the court’s conclusion seemed inconsistent 
with the guns-in-school and gender-violence 
cases and that there were real problems with 
using an analysis of the commerce clause to 
regulate “the taking of a hapless toad that, for 
reasons of its own, lives its entire life in Cali-
fornia.”15 The case has since been settled. The 
development is going ahead in a way that pro-
tects the toad’s habitat.16
the future of the commerce 
cl ause
Twain’s short story has been termed “a living 
American fairy tale, acted out annually in Cala-
veras County.”1 In what might be termed a living 
American government tale, nominees to the Su-
preme Court are routinely asked to explain their 
judicial philosophy of constitutional and statu-
tory interpretation to the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee. Asked about his “hapless toad” opinion 
during the Senate confirmation hearings on his 
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nomination to replace Rehnquist as chief justice, 
Roberts said: “The whole point of my argument 
in the dissent was that there was another way to 
look at this [i.e., the approach taken by the Fifth 
Circuit Court in the Cave Species case]. . . . I 
did not say that even in this case that the deci-
sion was wrong. . . . I simply said, let’s look at 
those other grounds for decision because that 
doesn’t present this problem.” These hearings 
provide an opportunity for all Americans to re-
view their understanding of our constitutional 
government and the manner in which it allo-
cates power between the federal government and 
the 50 states. To the extent that this division of 
power is determined by the Court’s view of the 
commerce clause, a return to an expansive read-
ing of this clause seems both likely and, given 
the interdependence of the national and global 
economies, proper.
Of course, the fact that Congress has au-
thority over a particular subject — such as 
whether to adopt a system of national licensure 
for physicians — does not mean that its au-
thority is unlimited or even that Congress will 
use it. Rather, as Justice Stevens noted, cases 
such as the California medical-marijuana case 
lead to other central constitutional questions, 
as yet unresolved. These questions include 
whether patients, terminally ill or not, have a 
constitutional right not to suffer — at least, 
when their physicians know how to control 
their pain.12
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